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This study examined the functional impact of public accounts committee on public accountability over financial 
crimes in Nigeria. Purposefully, the study assessed the extent PAC function has impact on public accountability 
in Nigeria; the impact of PAC function on transparency and accountability in Nigeria; and the significance of 
PAC function for public accountability over financial crimes in Nigeria. The researcher used descriptive and 
survey designs to carry out the study. The respondents were seventy-six (76) accounting officers/accountants and 
auditors drawn from federal and state establishments in Rivers/Bayelsa states. The data obtained was facilitated 
by administering a research questionnaire of thirty-five (35) items to eighty-five (85) accounting 
officers/accountants and auditors, having a response rate of 89%. Among other things, the findings of the study 
revealed that to a moderate extent PAC function has impact on public accountability in Nigeria. There is also a 
significant impact of PAC function on transparency and accountability in Nigeria; and a great significance of 
PAC function for public accountability over financial crimes in Nigeria. Although, Nigerian PAC functions to a 
moderate extent in terms of enhancing public accountability, there is still need for the PAC to adopt effective 
approach towards accountability facets of popular control, equilibrium of power and reflective governance. In 
light of this, the study concluded that the function of PAC to a moderate extent has impact on public 
accountability over financial crimes in Nigeria. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Public Account Committee (PAC) serves as a body which takes evidence from Accounting Officers to confirm 
the comments of the Auditor-General’s annual report. The committee also report on the major irregularities 
established and make recommendations on necessary corrective action. This function that public accounts 
committee carries out, should be purposeful to ensure public accountability over rampant financial crimes 
experienced in Nigeria. The point to note is that if public accountability is effective, could there be frequent loss 
of public funds and assets? 
Specifically, what might be the best practices of public accounts committee? Based on comparative 
“best practices” is not always evident. However, it is a fact that much of public accounts committee best 
practices depends on institutional settings, needs and contexts. Despite that, legislatures across the world are 
faced with the challenge to engage in the audit stage of the budgetary process to ensure legislative oversight of 
the use of public moneys. Hence, the status of the public accounts committee has traditionally occupied a 
heightened status over other committees in the legislature. In many countries, it is the oldest parliamentary 
committee. The Gladstonian reforms in Britain gave rise to the creation of a Public Accounts Committee in 1861, 
and many other Commonwealth countries followed this model from there on. The historical fact that the public 
accounts committee tends to be one of the oldest of all parliamentary committees indicates that its importance as 
the legislature apex for financial oversight and scrutiny has long been recognized. 
Generally speaking, it is the primary duty of the public accounts committee to examine the reports of 
the auditor general. But the committee differs from most other committees in the sense that it is prevented from 
questioning the wisdom of the underlying policy that informs public spending. Rather, it is asked to investigate 
whether spending did comply with the legislature intentions and expected standards, and also whether value for 
money was obtained (May Erskine, 1983:728). 
The public accounts committee does not seek to concern itself with policy; its interest is in whether 
policy is carried out efficiently, effectively and economically. Its main functions are to see that public moneys 
are applied for the purposes prescribed by legislature, that extravagance and waste are minimized and that sound 
financial practices are encouraged in estimating and contracting and in administration generally. However, in 
practice, it is often difficult to strictly separate financial management from policy issues. In addition, members of 
some public accounts committee report expanding latitude in challenging policy issues through the committee 
process, a process that seems to have been accelerated as the depth and frequency of value for money audits has 
increased. In such investigations, results might lead themselves to questioning policy choices, notably in relation 
to issues of effectiveness. In practice, this might require increased awareness to ensure that the efficacy of the 
public accounts committee process is not undermined by party political disagreements. 
From the conceptual overview of public accounts committee, its function, inter alia, is to ensure public 
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accountability in government spending. According to koleade (1992:188), accountability in government goes 
beyond stewardship function. This is so because in government there is the added dimension of complexity 
which is one of the most significant aspects of management in government complexity, not irrationality, in 
assessing whether one use of allocation of resources is better or yields more benefits than another. This 
complexity has very serious consequences when decisions taken by public officers are brought under open and 
public scrutiny particularly by those who were either out parties to those decisions or are even incapable of 
appreciating the intricacies of such decisions. Furthermore, Koleade (1992:190) expounded on the fact that the 
system of accountability has been found to evolve in stages and closely follow political watersheds and the 
growing concerns of the citizenry in any country. The evolution however follows the same pattern from place to 
place. The drive for accountability often begins with an enthusiastic pursuit for probity and integrity on the part 
of public administrators. The budgeting, accounting and auditing activities are geared towards guarding against 
abuse and misuse and bureaucrats are acquitted if they can prove that they have not converted to or used 
government resources for unauthorized purpose. 
In the face of these functions, yet Nigeria experience financial crime in successive manner. Admittedly, 
the history of corruption in Nigeria is strongly rooted in over 29 years of military rule, out of 46 years of her 
statehood since 1960. Successive military regimes subdued the rule of law, facilitated the wanton looting of the 
public treasury, decapitated public institutions and free speech and instituted a secret and opaque culture in the 
running of government business. This same culture is transferred to democratic civilian rule in which carry-go 
concept was introduced to waste government funds. Then, what is the public image about public accounts 
committee towards public accountability over such financial crimes in Nigeria, is the interest of this study. 
 
Statement of the problem 
There is a global trend towards greater openness in government finances. This is based on a belief that 
transparent budgetary practices can ensure that funds raised by the state for public purposes will be spent as 
promised by the government, while maximizing the benefits derived from spending. One crucial aspect of a 
transparent system of resource allocation involves an independent assurance of the integrity of public budgeting 
through an audit process, and the scrutiny of its outcomes by the representatives of the people, in the form of 
legislature setup as public accounts committee (PAC). 
However, if actually Nigerian public accounts committee live up to expectations as per its functional 
role, why are the masses so perplexed about the prevailing condition of public accountability of government 
financial activities and the rampant financial crimes across the nation? Since we have by legislature, Public 
Accounts Committee, what impact does its function has on public accountability? If public accountability is 
enforced by public accounts committee through an audit process, why then so many rampant financial crimes? In 
other words, in what ways public accounts committee influence public accountability and with what outcomes so 
far achieved. Providing solutions to this puzzled situation will reveal the mystery of this research study. 
 
Objective of the study 
The purpose of this study is to examine the functional impact of public accounts committee on public 
accountability over financial crimes in Nigeria. It is a dicey situation in Nigerian political environment today that 
many people forced themselves into politics just to have fun and get a share of the National cake of the 
Federation account, which is not, secured enough for proper use. This in turn causes severe economic hardship 
on the lives of less privileged Nigerians. 
In the light of the growing interest and controversy surrounding the emerging stream of research being 
carried out on poor management of public funds, this study has three (3) objectives to provide empirical 
evidence of: (1) the relationship between public accounts committee and public accountability; (2) the impact of 
public accounts committee on transparency and accountability in Nigeria; and (3) the significance of public 
accounts committee’s function for public accountability over financial crimes in Nigeria. The outcome of 
examining these issues will provide solutions to this study. 
 
Research questions 
Research questions serve as a guide to direct attention to the main areas of concentration in study. Hence, the 
attempt to trace the lines of evidence of the questions enumerated below will help us to understand the true 
position of Nigerian public accounts committee’s function and what impact made on enhancing transparency and 
accountability to safeguard public funds. 
 What is the relationship between public accounts committee function and public accountability? 
 What impact has public accounts committee function made on transparency and accountability in 
Nigeria? 
 To what extent did public accounts committee actually ensure public accountability in Nigeria? 
 To what extent can public accounts committee function effectively without the independent support of 
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Auditor-General for the Federation? 
 What is the significance of public accounts committee function for public accountability over financial 
crimes in Nigeria? 
 
Statement of hypotheses 
Based on the conceptual overview of this study, the following hypotheses are hereby proposed. 
1.  There is a positive and significant relationship between public accounts committee and     
      public accountability in Nigeria. 
2.  There is a significant impact of public accounts committee on transparency and     
     accountability in Nigeria. 
3. There is a great significance of public accounts committee function for public      
     accountability over financial crimes in Nigeria. 
 
Significance of the study 
The lack of an effective system of public accountability can pave way for inability to safeguard public funds and 
assets. In the recent past, apart from few escape goats, financial malpractice cases disclosed have not been 
properly dealt with and officials involved in the scene either received new political appointments or maintain 
their political portfolios. This lack of liability for the acts of malpractice allows such perpetrators to continue, 
leading the oil rich country to a severe economic hardship. Consequently, patriotic individuals are inquisitive 
about the functional impact of public accounts committee on public accountability and why the perpetual looting 
of public funds in Nigeria. This aspect requires attention of a research study in order to give coverage in form of 
documentation. 
Basically, the significance of this study is derived from the effort to contribute to existing literature on 
the subject matter. It also proffers suggestions to improve on public accountability in Nigeria. Specifically, 
genuine political Administrators, Accounting officers/Accountants and Auditors in Federal, State and Local 
governments will find this study useful in terms of transparency and accountability. Hence, the study focused on 
the activities of Nigerian public accounts committee, her expectations and influence on public accountability, 
which can create a hedge to rampant financial crimes in the country. Therefore, if the measures recommended 
are adopted in good practice, economic and financial crimes in the country can be reduced. 
 
Scope and limitation of the study 
This study lies within the scope of examining the functional impact of public accounts committee on public 
accountability over financial crimes in Nigeria. Imperatively, the research covers only a cross-section of public 
Accounting Officers/Accountants and Auditors in Nigeria. Therefore, the accessible population is based on 
selected public Accounting Officers/ Accountants and Auditors in Federal ministries and parastatals (Port 
Harcourt and Yenagoa areas), both in headquarters levels (in Abuja) respectively. 
The study subjects consist of a limited number of sampling units, which represent the target population. 
Thus, the researcher designate selected sampling units in Federal ministries and parastatals to be representative 
of the accessible population. This is due to time and cost constraints to carry out the research study by 
administering questionnaire and cross-examining the respondents, face-to-face interview to obtain valid and 
reliable information. 
 
Organization of the study 
The study is organized into various sections to give this report in reality. These sections are arranged into five 
chapters followed by supplementary pages. The first chapter gives the introductory part of the study that has to 
do with understanding of the research problem and other requirements involved in the study. Chapter two 
reviews other existing related literature that concern this study. Chapter three contains the methods applied to 
carry out this study including data collection procedures and analysis techniques. Chapter four presents the data 
so far collected, the analysis and discussion of findings. Chapter five gives a summary review of the findings, 
conclusions and recommendations of the study. 
Finally, the supplementary pages contain the references of other related literatures used to support the 
study, and the appendices. Nevertheless, the organization of this study is not different from the prescribed 
procedures of research methods in administrative sciences. 
 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Constitution of public accounts committee 
There should be a constituted Public Accounts Committee as soon as possible by the Assembly, i.e. a standing 
Public Accounts Committee for the duration of the Assembly. The Committee members to be elected by the 
Assembly from among its Members and the Finance Minister shall be ex-officio member, but the Finance 
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Minister shall have no right of vote until he is an elected member of the Committee. The quorum for the meeting 
of the Committee shall be three members of the Committee. 
Casual vacancies shall be filled by election as soon as possible after they occur and any person elected 
to fill such a vacancy shall hold office for so long only as the person in whose place he is elected would have 
held office. The Chairman of the Committee shall be elected by the Committee from among its members. In case 
of any equality of votes on any matter, the Chairman shall have a second or casting vote (Pakistan Institute of 
Legislative Development And Transparency, 2004:41). 
 
The membership of the public accounts committee 
What should the membership of the PAC look like? Who should serve as chairperson of the committee, and what 
role does this function require? This section briefly looks at some broad trends with regard to these issues.  
Composition and size of PAC is also considered. In the majority of parliaments, and as tends to be the case in 
most other committees, the proportion of government and opposition members reflects the proportions in the 
house. However, whether this is possible also depends on the total size of the committee, and the number of 
parties represented in the house. While the size of a PAC varies, it has on average 11 members (Organization of 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2001:7). 
 
Appointing the Chairperson 
It is a long -standing tradition in many parliaments that the chairperson of the PAC has to be a member of the 
opposition. A recent survey indicates that this principle is adhered to in two thirds of PACs, underlining the non-
partisan tradition that underpins the work of the PAC and the willingness of the government to promote 
transparency through independent scrutiny. In some cases, the tradition to award the chair of the PAC to an 
opposition member might simply reflect an unwritten convention, whereas elsewhere this principle has been 
written into the rules of the house. 
The chairperson is to play certain roles, i.e. he has to ensure the smooth and effective running of the 
committee. In particular, PAC chairpersons are responsible for setting the committee’s agenda, usually in 
consultation with the committee and the auditor general. The latter should be able to indicate the flow 
of reports to be released, which should allow the committee to plan ahead reasonably well. The chairperson is 
also crucial in fostering a culture of consensus in the committee, by steering it clear of party political divisions as 
far as possible (Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development, 2001:7). 
 
Committee staff and additional support 
At a minimum, the committee should have a clerk or secretary. A recent study group on PACs recommended 
additional possibilities (Commonwealth Parliamentary Association 2001, pp. 78-79): “Secondments of experts 
from overseas or from the secretariat of another Parliament are also, subject to funding being available, another 
way of providing capacity and helping to build capacity in the future by local staff learning from the skill that the 
secondees have to impart.” 
 
Functions of the Committee 
(1) The Committee shall deal with the Appropriation Accounts of the Provincial Government and the report of 
the Auditor-General thereon and such other matters as the Finance Minister may refer to the Committee. 
(2) In scrutinizing the Appropriation Accounts of the Provincial Government and the report of the Auditor-
General thereon, it shall be the duty of the Committee on Public Accounts to satisfy itself:  
 That the money shown in the accounts as having been disbursed were legally available for and 
applicable to the service or purpose to which they have been applied or charged; 
 That the expenditure conforms to the authority which governs it; and 
 That every re-appropriation has been made in accordance with such rules as may be prescribed by the 
Government.  
(3) It shall also he the duty of the Committee on Public Accounts: 
 To examine the statements of accounts showing the income and expenditure of State Corporations, 
Trading and Manufacturing Schemes, concerns and projects together with the balance-sheets and 
statements of profit and loss accounts which the Governor may have required to be prepared or are 
prepared under the provisions of the statutory rules regulating the financing of a particular Corporation, 
a trading concern or project and the report of the Auditor General, made to the Governor thereon; 
 To examine the statement of Accounts showing the income and expenditure of autonomous and semi-
autonomous bodies the audit of which may be conducted by the Auditor-General under the direction of 
statutory requirement; and 
 To consider the report of the Auditor-General in cases where the Governor may have required him to 
conduct the audit of any receipt or to examine the accounts of stores and stocks (PILDAT, 2004:41). 
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The role of public accounts committee 
The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) has an important role to play in government accountability; its 
effectiveness is hampered by several weaknesses. These weaknesses are largely rooted in the overall context of 
the legislature and political system and are not easily changed. This larger context includes: 
 The heavy turnover of parliamentary committee membership; 
 The general lack of interest among members of parliament in accountability issues; 
 The difficulty of distinguishing between issues of “policy” and of administration”; and, 
 The unclear status of public servants before parliamentary committees and in the accountability system 
more generally. 
Each of these factors has considerable effect on the operations and impact of the Public Accounts 
Committee. They are also intertwined with much larger issues of parliamentary representation and responsible 
government. The PAC is part of the overall standing committee system of the House of Representatives, and this 
is essential in understanding its role. While the PAC is sui generis in its mandate, it is one of several committees 
at present, and by no means considered the most desirable of these committees for assignment. If we assume a 
committee can only be as good as its members, the PAC faces serious challenges. Its membership changes 
constantly. Many of its members do not seem to value, much less covet, the assignment; nor do they necessarily 
have appropriate backgrounds or experience to investigate issues of government administration. Discussions of 
the Committee that fail to note these issues risk overestimating its abilities and members’ enthusiasm for their 
role. 
Another major concern surrounding the PAC is the lack of rules surrounding the testimony of public 
servants before parliamentary committees. While public servants appear regularly before the PAC and other 
committees, the expectations and understandings surrounding their appearances can be very unclear. What 
questions can be asked? When should a public servant defer to answer what is deemed a “political” question? 
Without precise standards, it is up to members to struggle over these questions, often for their own tactical 
advantage. The Committee relies heavily on the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) for its agenda and the 
Auditor’s investigative resources, to the extent that it has little capacity and perhaps little desire to conduct its 
own independent investigations. Instead, the PAC serves as a forum for discussing Office of the Auditor General 
findings and holding government to account. But the massive profile and esteem enjoyed by the Auditor General 
may mean that PAC members find little political visibility or reward in their roles. This study examines this key 
tension and notes how the PAC does seem to labour in the Auditor’s shadow. However, it is not clear whether 
the Committee would benefit from some type of expanded role, given its status as a legislative standing 
committee rather than a truly autonomous body. Instead its most effective role may be to amplify the findings of 
the Auditor General as it now already does. For the Committee to improve or expand its role there must be larger 
changes in the parliamentary culture and greater clarity in how Parliament can hold public servants to account. 
Legislature engagement with the budget normally has several stages. First, parliament votes public 
moneys, and then it might monitor budget execution. Finally, parliament has to consider whether budget 
implementation complied with its wishes. The audit of accounts has traditionally been performed by a body 
distinct from the legislature, in some cases a court or an auditor general.  But it is parliament that is tasked with 
considering the results of such an audit. While some legislatures do not have a dedicated committee to perform 
this function, many legislatures have established PACs for this purpose. This is especially the case in the 
Westminster tradition of government, where parliament has retained only minimal and usually symbolic ex ante 
control over the budget, and instead focuses on ex post scrutiny (Schick 2002:33-35; Davey 2000). 
 
The relationship between PAC and the Auditor-General 
The relationship between parliament and the audit institution varies between systems. As a tradition, the PAC is 
the primary audience of the auditor general, and it is vital that a cordial relationship is maintained between the 
two. While the PAC depends on high quality audit reporting to be effective, the auditor general in turn requires 
an effective PAC to ensure that departments take audit outcomes seriously.  Usually, such restructuring has not 
abolished the functions exercised by the PAC, but ended the latter’s exclusive focus on audit scrutiny. In New 
Zealand, for instance, the functions of the former Public Accounts Committee were given to the Public 
Expenditure Committee in 1962 and to the Finance and Expenditure Committee in 1985. The functions of the 
latter committee are wider than those of a traditional PAC, and include the ‘audit of the Crown’s and 
departmental financial statements, Government finance, revenue and taxation’. Comment by Matthew Louwrens.  
For the terms of reference of Canadian PACs, refer to the Canadian Council of Public Accounts Committees 
(2002: 27-56).  
All reports of the auditor general are addressed to parliament, and the auditor general or a 
representative will attend the sittings of the PAC. In some cases, the PAC can request the auditor general to 
conduct a specific investigation, and the auditor general has no discretion and must do so. More recently, audit 
institutions have also tended to develop a more ad hoc advisory function, whereby the legislature requests advice 
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or comments on specific issues under consideration. Especially in the absence or lack of dedicated legislature 
research capacity, this can broaden the access of parliament to independent expert analysis. 
As noted, over 90 percent of the PAC’s inquiries are concerned with Auditor General’s reports, and it 
relies heavily on the Auditor’s research and resources. Even the small number of other inquiries is sometimes 
linked to Auditor-inspired inquiries. For example, its report on ministerial and deputy ministerial accountability 
was not directly related to an Auditor General Report, but was closely linked to its earlier Sponsorship Inquiry 
stemming from Auditor General Report. The relationship with the Auditor General can hardly be overstated. As 
one participant puts it, the Office of the Auditor-General is “the eyes and ears of the Committee” and presents 
“the facts,” while the Committee itself holds individuals to account for what the Auditor-General has found. For 
at least one member, this has become too dependent a relationship: “the Auditor has gone to a status where we 
agree with everything he says. The Auditor is a little too powerful in the eyes of the Committee and we shouldn’t 
become too raptured.” But another member of the same Party said the relationship was “a very good balance.” In 
general, the relationship does seem complementary with each role distinct. While the Auditor provides the 
Committee with fodder for discussion, the Committee provides a public forum for the further examination of 
government activities. The PAC provides several distinct strengths to the Auditor General’s inquiries. First, it 
can draw further attention and notice to issues raised by the Auditor General. While Auditor-General reports 
usually receive good or exceptional media coverage, this coverage may focus on minor sensational items, rather 
than more substantive and complex issues. Even when coverage is more thoughtful, journalists rarely have the 
time and space to dig deeply and sustain their inquiries. The PAC is able to revisit reports, often after the initial 
wave of attention, and attract further sustained attention to issues and problems. Second, committees offer a 
venue for the Auditor General and public servants alike both to present fairly their perspectives and to hear the 
other side in a public forum. Auditors are given further opportunity to press their concerns, while public servants 
have an opportunity to answer and explain. The PAC ideally provides an evenhanded and reasonably formal 
setting for this, through the calling and individual questioning of witnesses in public meetings with recorded 
transcripts. Third, the Committee provides additional public and visible pressure on governments to change or 
account for their actions. While its reports and recommendations may not have immediate influence, they remain 
important and easily accessible aspects of the public record. But on the other hand, members may resent 
labouring in the Auditor’s shadow. And, it is very difficult to find the line between the Auditor General’s 
investigatory role and the PAC’s accountability role. While these roles are often identified as “fact finding” 
versus “political accountability,” it is not clear how we can distinguish the two. PAC members may question 
how much they actually add to the Auditor General’s inquiries and what “political accountability” actually 
means. It is difficult to answer this question or investigate it in empirical terms. But the contribution of the PAC 
may be limited, given the Committee’s rapid member turnover, thin staff resources, and MPs’ lack of interest in 
accountability. Nuance, reflection and genuine interest in good governance and administration often seem lost in 
Committee struggles. While the Committee can and does produce thoughtful reports, they seem largely to 
amplify the existing reports of the Auditor General rather than break new ground. Key, however, is the PAC’s 
ability to question publicly witnesses, unlike either the Auditor General or Question Period. In this way, the 
Committee does indeed hold government to account, publicly, for its actions. Whether the media pays much 
attention is perhaps not important; what is important is the public record and the potential for further attention. A 
PAC appearance is not taken lightly by public servants, and this provides powerful and transparent follow-up of 
the Auditor General’s investigations. 
 
The supporting function of the Auditor-General 
The office of the auditor general is the primary resource available to the committee, and accompanies the work 
of the PAC on an ongoing basis. In some cases, the Finance Ministry also provides officials to follow and 
support committee deliberations. Such support may involve having to answer questions from committee 
members, and the provision of requested information (Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, 2001a). 
PACs can draw on the auditor general’s office for secretariat assistance either on an ad hoc basis or through a 
programme of regular secondments. Compared with other parliamentary committees, but depending on the 
nature and extent of expertise in the audit institution, the PAC therefore has access to substantial logistical and 
technical backing. 
 
The relationship between PAC and the Executive 
The fact that the PAC is not to question the policy underlying spending decisions impacts on who the committee 
holds to account. The normal legal construction is that a minister is the political head of a department, whereas a 
Permanent Secretary or Director General is the administrative head of a department. While the former requires 
policy direction, the latter function includes responsibility for day to day administrative and financial matters. 
The administrative head of a department normally signs the accounts of the entity in her or his function as 
accounting officer. One practical consequence of this is that the work of PACs traditionally focuses on 
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interrogating the administrative head instead of the minister, as the task is not to scrutinize the political direction. 
 
The content of PAC work 
The exact content of the work of the PAC depends largely on what it receives from the audit institution. In a 
recent survey, 85 per cent of PACs indicate that their work primarily depended on the auditor general’s report. A 
first determinant is the material audit jurisdiction of the audit institution, which refers to what types of audit are, 
performed (White et al, 1999:19). The traditional focus of public sector management has been on compliance. 
But the past years have seen a reorientation to a more performance-oriented outlook, which is increasingly 
reflected in the reporting content of auditors. In addition, the content of PAC work is determined by its 
institutional remit. For example, should PACs in national or state legislatures engage with local government 
audit reports? What is their role in the financial oversight of publicly owned companies and other non-
departmental public bodies? 
 
Financial audit 
This term summarises the traditional focus of public sector auditing. One output is usually a certification whether 
the figures in the accounts are properly stated the money was used as intended by parliament, and that payments 
and receipts accord with relevant legislation and regulations (White et al 1999:21-24). This involves a judgment 
of expenditure and receipts, as represented in the accounts, against key benchmarks such as regularity and 
propriety. Regularity refers to the requirement for items of expenditure and receipts to be dealt with in 
accordance with the legal and regulatory framework, such as the relevant appropriation act and any applicable 
permanent legislation. Expenditure must also have been duly authorized. Propriety is concerned with the 
expectations of parliament as to the way in which public business should be conducted, such as the avoidance of 
personal gain, even-handedness, open competition, and the avoidance of waste. 
 
Value for money audit 
In addition to the above, audit institutions increasingly produce value for money studies. The term captures the 
“3Es” of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. It is sometimes summarized that these refer to, respectively, 
spending less, spending well, and spending wisely. In systems that are implementing performance-oriented 
reforms, the PAC should engage closely with this process to ensure that the information generated is useful and 
relevant for the committee. Some countries are moving towards greater involvement of sectoral committees in 
considering value for money studies. For instance, value for money audit was included in the mandate of the 
Canadian Auditor General in 1977, and now makes up about 60 per cent of total audit activity (Blöndal 2001:39-
84). Exact definitions vary, but the following ratios illustrate the concepts: Economy is concerned with the ratio 
of inputs (such as staff and buildings) against cost (in monetary terms). Efficiency is concerned with output (a 
particular good or service) divided by input. Effectiveness may be measured by considering outcomes (the 
impact on society) against outputs. Refer to Kristensen et al (2002:7-34) for a good overview, and also National 
Audit Office (1998). A frequently stated formula is that performance measures need to be smart: specific, 
measurable, achievable, results-focused, and time-bound. 
 
Government departments and agencies 
Government departments are the primary subjects of PAC scrutiny. However, recent years have seen an 
increasing trend in some countries towards the creation of semi-autonomous agencies that are wholly or largely 
funded with public money, in a drive by government to hive off operational responsibility. Normally, these fall 
under the overall responsibility of a particular minister. At the same time, the chief executives of such agencies 
are usually accountable to parliament and to the PAC in their role as accounting officers. Therefore, while one 
particular department may be politically responsible, different accounting officers might have to be called to 
account for different activities under that department, which somewhat blurs traditional and linear notions of 
accountability (Marshall 1991, pp. 467-469). 
Local government authorities normally do not fall within the remit of PACs. When the mandate of the 
committee refers to national government operations, for instance, it would be inappropriate for it to get involved 
in local government financial matters, which should be dealt with through subnational accountability 
arrangements. Some legislatures have assigned the task of considering audit reports on local government to a 
separate committee, viz. the committee concerned with local government affairs. However, jurisdictional 
parameters and committee mandates are decisive when determining whether local government financial affairs 
are a legitimate concern for the PAC, as the focus of the committee’s work needs to be within its mandate. 
As regards to publicly own companies, the role of the state in the economy is changing in many 
countries, and privatization measures are reducing the number of publicly owned companies. Still, in many 
countries governments are involved in commercial activities, notably through publicly owned companies. The 
financial oversight of such companies has often not been part of the mandate of the PAC, but sometimes of a 
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separate committee. For instance, in the Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago, a separate Public Accounts 
Enterprises Committee examines audited accounts of state enterprises that are owned or controlled by the state. 
Similarly, the Committee on Public Undertakings of the Indian Parliament considers reports, accounts, and audit 
reports of key state enterprises (Wehner, 2001:9). 
 
The public accounts committee process 
The PAC process has its starting point with a report from the auditor general. The prime mechanism for 
considering such reports is the hearing, at which witnesses are called before the committee to answer to 
questions by members on critical issues raised. After the conclusion of a hearing, the committee has to finalize 
its own report based on its findings, and make sure that the government implements any recommendations. 
 
Choosing audit reports to be considered 
The overwhelming majority of work of the PAC is dedicated to dealing with auditor general reports. Due to a 
lack of time, the PAC often cannot consider all accounts, but is forced to prioritize. One option is to focus on 
those accounts involving a qualified audit opinion. However, it might seem unsatisfactory to forfeit 
parliamentary scrutiny altogether for some accounts, even if they are given a (relatively) clean bill of health. 
Commenting on some weaknesses of the PAC process in the British House of Commons, White et. al. 
(1999:131-132) suggest additional possibilities for prioritizing the work of the committee: “It would seem to 
make sense to have some sort of hierarchy of [National Audit Office] reports. Those which deal with more 
serious financial control issues, and give most cause for concern, could be subject to a full-blown hearing. Those 
reports which throw up less serious problems could be subject to a report based on written evidence, or simply 
contain a requirement that the department concerned has to respond to the National Audit Office (NAO) report. 
A further alternative which would make better use of the NAO whilst easing pressure on the PAC’s time would 
be for departmentally related select committees to examine NAO reports.” 
 
Preparing for hearings 
After receiving a report from the auditor, hearings are the principle mechanism by which officials from 
departments, agencies or other relevant bodies answer to the PAC. The PAC should plan its programme carefully 
in consultation with the auditor general, so that the release of reports is synchronized with parliamentary 
hearings. A quality hearing requires preparation by committee members as well as witnesses. In some country 
PACs, individual members are asked to scrutinize separate sections of a report. In others, each member is 
responsible for every audit report. An audit report is in many systems accompanied by a briefing document from 
the auditor general, circulated prior to a hearing, which might suggest areas in a report that warrant particular 
attention. In addition, individual members sometimes conduct their own research on issues of their interest to 
supplement the available information. A qualified opinion would indicate that the accounts or financial 
management practices did not fully meet all required standards (Harris, 2001:613). 
 
Conducting hearings 
The number and scheduling of hearings conducted by a PAC each year differ greatly between countries, which 
primarily depends on the quantity and flow of reporting from the audit institution. While it is important that the 
PAC considers the advice of the auditor general, the committee should not be constrained in its choice of which 
aspects of an audit report should be further investigated. Harris (2001:613) summarises for the Australian case: 
“The ability to consider and report on any circumstances connected with reports of the Auditor-General or with 
the financial accounts and statements of Commonwealth agencies is one of the main sources of the committee’s 
authority – it gives the committee the capacity to initiate its own references and, to a large extent, to determine 
its own work priorities. This power is unique among parliamentary committees and gives the committee a 
significant degree of independence from the executive arm of government.” The summonsed officials appear in 
front of the PAC during the hearing, normally in the form of the accounting officer. Many committees also 
question additional individuals, although the minister is not usually summonsed. Individual members of the 
committee should each have a chance to ask question. In Britain, for instance, the PAC of the House of 
Commons allows the chairperson 30 minutes for questioning, at the beginning of a session. Afterwards, each 
ordinary member of the committee has no more than 15 minutes to pose questions. While this limitation has its 
disadvantages, it also ensures that hearings are concluded expeditiously (White et. al. 1999:124). Other 
committees have no such time restrictions whatsoever. 
 
Reporting and recommendations 
If minutes of evidence are published, witnesses should be given a chance to check these for accuracy before their 
publication. Usually, it is the responsibility of the chairperson to draft a report, with assistance from the 
committee clerk. Some auditors prepare a set of recommendations as a basis for committee deliberations, to 
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support this process. However, in some countries, the auditor general does not participate in the drafting of PAC 
reports, to maintain the independence of the committee. The draft report is debated in the PAC, where any 
changes can be proposed, and accepted or rejected. While it is not normally required that PAC reports have to be 
adopted unanimously by the committee, some committees have found it useful to hold back reports until 
consensus has been established. The minutes of evidence of a particular hearing as well as the committee report 
should be published as promptly as possible. In a recent survey, 87 per cent of PACs indicated that their reports 
are freely available to the general public. In addition, 57 per cent of PACs have their reports debated in the house. 
Often, this takes the form of an annual debate, which can focus on a selection of particularly pertinent reports.   
 
Following up on implementation 
The finalization of a report by the committee should not be the end of the PAC process. Reports only have 
practical value if the government addresses the issues it raises, and implements the recommendations of the 
committee. In practice, while experiences vary, the Treasury Minute is not always a satisfactory mechanism for 
ensuring that the committee’s recommendations are acted upon. The responses it contains may not always be 
very specific, and it can be difficult, given parliament’s often-limited resources, to ensure independently that 
sufficient action was taken by the government to address particular concerns of the PAC. Some countries go 
further in their follow-up through the use of a formal tracking report produced regularly by the audit institution. 
Tabled at a later stage, for instance two years after an initial audit report, it systematically considers the extent of 
implementation of each set of recommendations adopted by the committee. Rather than a separate tracking 
report, some auditor generals follow a process whereby they include a review of departmental action on previous 
recommendations in an annual audit report. In addition, with regard to particularly important issues, it might be 
useful to consider interim reporting requirements to ensure that the government takes remedial action as speedily 
as possible. This might take the form of periodic briefings of the committee by relevant officials (Joachim 
Wehner, 2002:15). 
 
Following up on audit recommendations – the German case 
The lower house of the German Parliament, the Bundestag, receives an audit report about ten months after the 
end of a fiscal year. The report is based on about 1000 individual audits, and focuses on about 100 of the most 
important ones. It contains information on broader financial management issues as well as detailed comments 
across departments. The report is considered in the Committee on Public Accounts, a subcommittee of the 
Budget Committee, where membership is proportionately distributed according to party representation in 
Parliament. Each member is assigned the role of rapporteur for a specific ministry, and has to scrutinize the 
remarks on this entity in the audit report. The relevant ministers or at least high-ranking bureaucrats, Finance 
Ministry officials and auditors take part in the relevant discussions. The Federal Court of Audit prepares a draft 
recommendation for each item. If adopted, the executive is obliged to implement the recommendations, and has 
to report on its progress in this regard within a set timeframe. Most decisions are taken unanimously, and about 
90 per cent of the recommendations of the Federal Court of Audit are endorsed. The Budget Committee 
generally accepts the views of the subcommittee and refers its report to the plenary. The Federal Court of Audit 
also produces a follow-up report two years later. This report documents whether the Bundestag adopted a 
recommendation by the Federal Court of Audit, and, if so, to what extent the relevant department implemented it. 
This tracking mechanism enforces compliance with committee recommendations by departments, which face 




There are a number of issues relating to the day to day functioning of the committee that have to be addressed. 
These include the rules or conventions that apply to decision taking, the frequency of committee meetings, 
whether sittings should be open to the media and the general public, and how to ensure attendance by members. 
Finally, many committees face a substantial workload. In order to manage a demanding programme, some PACs 
have established an internal structure that enables a division of labour within the committee. Regarding decision 
taking, there is a strong tradition in many parliaments that favours unanimity for PAC decisions. In some cases, 
the unanimity principle is enshrined in rules, but in most countries PAC reports can contain minority views. A 
rigid principle of unanimity in PAC decisions might be an unrealistic requirement, although all PACs should 
strive for consensus decisions to underline the nonpartisan approach to financial oversight. In some cases, when 
unanimity is not a formal requirement, the committee might sometimes decide to delay a report in order to 
establish consensus. This is likely to add to the strength and impact of the report, but it may not always be a 
feasible option. 
The frequency of meetings varies enormously across different countries, and a generalized judgment is 
impossible. Among the determining factors are the amount of reporting produced by the audit institution, 
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resources available to parliament, willingness of committee members, and the required or acceptable level of 
investigation. Each PAC has to ensure that it sets aside sufficient time to do justice to the audit reports tabled, 
and to reach a satisfactory level of scrutiny. Hence, there is a general trend to facilitate greater transparency in 
government. In the majority of legislatures, PAC hearings are open to the media and the general public. There 
might be reasons for barring the public in exceptional circumstances, for instances in discussions that relate to a 
central intelligence agency or highly sensitive defense matters. But, generally, there are few reasonable excuses 
to prevent open access of the media and the general public to PAC sessions. 
The issue of attendance is especially problematic when membership between committees overlaps. 
Small parties, in particular, often face trade-offs relating to how to spread a small number of members across 
numerous committees. However, as in all committees, poor attendance undermines the efficacy of the work of 
the PAC. In cases of membership overlap, the coordination of schedules with other committees is essential. 
Hence, effective internal organization is important in this regard. The heavier the workload of a committee, the 
more urgent becomes the need to enhance its capacity to process work in a timely and effective manner. As 
individual members have limited time and capacity, this might necessitate a division of labour within the PAC. 
This has often involved the creation of sub-committees. These can either be based on subject areas such as health 
or defense, in which case they might be more permanent. Or they might be formed in an ad hoc manner to 
address particular issues when they arise. Also, some PACs operate sub-committees to draft a working 
programme that is later discussed and adopted in the main committee. Yet another option is a rapporteur-based 
system that gives substantial responsibility to individual members of a committee. Whichever method is chosen, 
it is important that ultimately the final discussion and decision stage remain reserved for the main committee 
(Commonwealth Parliamentary Association 2001, pp. 68-69). 
 
Concept of public accountability  
The accountability of public organizations has become an increasingly complex issue for contemporary 
governments. The traditional parliamentary model of accountability that presumed a linear and hierarchical 
relationship between a public organization, a Minister and Parliament has decreasing relevance for the manner in 
which public services are actually delivered at the beginning of the 21st century. The need to reconsider 
accountability is apparent even for organizations that are components of “mainstream government.” Ministers 
have become less willing to accept full responsibility for the actions of their organizations, especially 
implementation decisions made at lower levels of those organizations, and the logic of government reforms has 
been that those lower level officials should have more latitude for making decisions and be more accountable for 
their actions. Further, given that a smaller percentage of public services are now delivered directly by ministerial 
departments, a re-examination of accountability is called for if the public sector is to slow, and perhaps even 
reverse, the public’s loss of confidence. Several changes in politics and public administration are driving changes 
in accountability. First, accountability as a form of democracy is increasingly important because of the decline of 
other forms of democracy. Participation in elections and membership in political parties have been declining 
steadily over the past several decades, and citizens appear to have lost much of their faith in the input institutions 
of democracy (Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Nye, King and Zelikow, 2000), such as voting. 
Thinking about democracy, by both political leaders and scholars, has shifted to some extent towards 
“output legitimation,” emphasizing the role of policy and administration in building the foundations of a 
legitimate state. In that setting, accountability, as well as the ability of citizens to participate in controlling 
organizations that deliver their services, becomes crucial to democratic politics. Public sector reforms also have 
emphasized participation by clients, and by the public in general, in the decisions of public organizations, so that 
accountability now is being exercised downward as well as upward. In some instances, the ability of clientele to 
exert influence over, and demand accountability from, public organizations has been formalized through advice 
and consultation institutions, while in other instances the relationships with the stakeholders are more informal 
and subtle. In all these relationships among clientele and service providers, however, it is clear that the public 
expects direct accountability from public organizations, and that representative institutions no longer are 
considered sufficient means of control. 
Further, public organizations must find ways to deal effectively with other organizations in their 
environment that are necessary for the success of their programs. Very few, if any, public sector organizations 
can now deliver services effectively without cooperating with other organizations, public or private. Even if they 
could ignore other actors in their policymaking environment, public organizations would probably be ill-advised 
to consider acting as a “single, lonely organization” and not attempt to work cooperatively with programs and 
organizations that can make their program more effective (Peters, forthcoming). Thus, public organizations must 
now respond to pressures coming from a range of political and social actors, and some of those pressures may 
conflict with traditional forms of control coming from ministers and Parliament. In particular, coordination may 
diffuse both financial and programmatic lines of control and make it difficult for traditional accountability 
organizations to assign responsibility for actions. The complexity involved in delivering contemporary public 
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services now also affects accountability because of the problem of “many hands” (Mulgan, 2000).The long 
chains of action involved in delivering services, and the number of actors involved in them, makes it difficult to 
identify the source of any administrative or policy failure, should one occur. As well, the capacity to track the 
utilization of public money involved in contracts, coordinated service delivery systems and partnership 
arrangements makes it more difficult to maintain fiscal accountability. 
Further, and central to the concerns of this paper, contracting powers granted without close supervision 
by Parliament, a Minister, or a board of directors may also make maintaining substantive accountability for 
policy decisions more difficult. These problems, arising from the involvement of multiple actors in the delivery 
of services, occur as policies are formulated and as the purposes for which contracts and other instruments of 
governing are being devised, as well as when the programs are being implemented with the contracts or 
cooperative mechanisms. 
Much of the focus on accountability of policy instruments such as contracts has been placed on 
implementation, but greater concern needs to be raised about the purposes for which these instruments are used 
and the content of the policy that is being implemented. Although the above-mentioned changes in patterns of 
governance are relevant, the most significant change affecting accountability in the public sector has been the 
increasing use of autonomous and quasi-autonomous organizations to deliver public services. A dominant 
pattern of reform in the public sector has been the creation of “agencies” to deliver public service (Pollitt,Talbot, 
Caulfield and Smullen, 2004).The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2002) referred to 
these structures as “Distributed Public Governance,” meaning that tasks that once were housed within Cabinet 
departments have now been widely dispersed. The public sector has as a consequence become more complex 
organizationally, with a large number of structures responsible for individual segments of policy, each having 
varying degrees of connection to public authority. A central justification motivating these reforms has been to 
separate policy-making and administration, with the presumption that greater managerial freedom would 
enhance the efficiency of the organizations (Polidano, 1999:3). 
The slogan “let the managers manage” is used to justify the increasing power of managers in making 
decisions within the public sector and consequent weakening of the hierarchical control of ministers over the 
activities for which they are nominally responsible. The argument in favour of creating agencies and analogous 
organizations has also been to some degree accountability; at least financial accountability. When a program is 
located within a larger department, it may be difficult for Parliament or auditors to assess the real costs for that 
program (Niskanen, 1971:89), because of cross-subsidization and shared overheads. Having each organization as 
a “tub on its own bottom” makes tracking costs and financial accountability more feasible, although the 
separation from direct ministerial authority may limit the mechanisms for enforcing accountability. Although 
separating ministries into numerous separate organizations providing a single service may have improved one 
aspect of accountability, it appears to have had a negative impact on other aspects. In addition to the 
complexities identified already, the problem of coordination and the linking of services has been exacerbated by 
the development of the dispersed model of service delivery. Coordination and coherence have always been 
difficult in the public sector, but disaggregating ministries has only increased the problems (Mountfield, 
2001:43). In accountability terms, the diffusion of responsibility for programs makes it difficult to trace authority 
and financial flows when managers attempt to overcome the internal divisions of government. 
Further, to reach its governance potential, the public sector must develop more coherent policy goals 
and integrated visions of the future; having multiple poorly coordinated organizations only increases the 
difficulty in governing in a coherent manner. To some extent, the use of these autonomous organizations is not 
new in the public sector, and analogous organizations have been used in the past. The logic of the contemporary 
changes is not dissimilar to that frequently used to justify the creation of agencies, public corporations, 
“quangos,” and a host of other organizations. Even from the initial use of these formats, there have been 
significant concerns (Smith and Hague, 1971:90) about the ability of conventional public sector processes to 
maintain acceptable levels of control over the processes and performance of those organizations. All of these 
formats involve organizations operating at arm’s length from government and therefore having greater latitude 
for action; as a result, they also present accountability problems. Most problems of accountability for 
autonomous organizations have been assumed to be rather familiar ones of “shirking” responsibilities in order to 
retain budget funds, or perhaps pursuing their own policy interests. The issues at the root of this Commission’s 
investigation are different, and seemingly more difficult for governments to cope with in the case of 
organizations such as Crown corporations. The problem encountered in this Inquiry has been an extreme case of 
“moral hazard” in which the agent pursues its own interests (in this case When autonomous or quasi-autonomous 
organizations are granted the latitude to make operational, and even strategic, decisions with minimal external 
supervision, the possibility for actions of this sort will always exist, and so accountability becomes an issue of 
ensuring conformity to the core policy and administrative values in the public sector, while still maintaining the 
autonomy considered necessary for efficiency. 
To this point, the discussion has dealt with accountability as if the meaning of the term were agreed 
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upon. In fact, the term accountability is used in at least four ways, each with rather different implications for 
public administration (Thomas, 2003).We should understand the differences among these concepts and be more 
careful when discussing accountability, both in academic and practical discourse. Indeed, if one conception of 
accountability is stressed, then performance on the other dimensions may be undermined. In addition to 
distinctions among the four versions of accountability, it is important to differentiate accountability from other 
controls over public organizations, and especially differentiate ex ante controls used to shape behaviour from 
accountability that tends to be largely ex post. In general governments have been shifting from ex ante to ex post 
controls, allowing greater latitude for organizational leaders, especially for organizations such as the Crown 




The simplest concept of accountability is “answerability,” or the notion that all an organization must do to satisfy 
its obligations is to answer for its actions. This obligation may be met simply by issuing an annual report, or 
making a statement to a legislative committee. If the statement is complete and truthful, then the obligation is 
discharged. The operational factor is transparency, and fear of public exposure of malfeasance may be sufficient 
to produce appropriate behaviour. This minimalist form of control, or lack thereof, is most commonly used for 
organizations that either operate primarily in the market or have relatively little public money, as is true for some 
Crown corporations. Answerability also is appropriate for organizations that are controlled primarily through 
competitive or mutuality pressures (Hood et al., 2004). Universities, for example, are controlled through peer 
review and competition for research money and for students, and hence have a relatively light accountability 
regimen. Further, organizations such as research laboratories and again universities that rely on expertise are 
generally more capable of escaping direct controls and stringent accountability.  
 
Accountability 
Accountability per se takes answerability one step further and demands that the individuals or organizations in 
question not only render an account of action, but that they be judged by some independent body on that action. 
In particular, accountability has come to mean that the public bureaucracy reports to a political organization, 
generally the legislature, and that it and the political officials in charge of the organization are scrutinized on 
their exercise of the public trust. That scrutiny also involves the possibility of sanctions being imposed on the 
managers or on the organization as a whole. In Westminster systems, the tradition has been that individual public 
servants would not be held to account in such a manner, although that practice is changing. As noted, however, 
the conduct of public organizations is now scrutinized by numerous actors in addition to the legislature, and even 
the legislature itself has been tending to utilize more instruments to exercise its oversight. For example, auditing 
organizations serving the legislative branch have been invigorated and have added substantial capacity in 
performance auditing as well as conventional financial auditing. There also has been a proliferation of 
inspectorates responsible for supervising particular organizations or areas of public policy, with power to 
sanction as well as simply exposing malfeasance (Power, 1997; Hood et al., 1999). For legislatures, the principal 
mechanism involved in producing compliance is hierarchy and the associated authority. Bureaucratic 
organizations, as agents of these legislative organizations, are mandated by law to perform certain acts and are 
constrained by rules of procedure. The actors involved in oversight therefore have legal standards against which 
to compare performance; they also have the legal resources to attempt to enforce conformity with the standards. 
 
Responsibility 
The term “responsibility” is also often used synonymously with accountability, but its meaning should be 
differentiated. While accountability is based upon a hierarchical and external relationship, responsibility involves 
a more inward source of control being exercised over the actions of public servants (Bovens, 1998). The 
individual public servant is expected to remain responsible to his or her own conception of the law being 
administered, as well as to an internalized set of values.1 In this view, the public servant must exercise some 
personal judgment about appropriate behaviour and may be called  upon to make an independent assessment of 
the legality of the actions that she or he is being mandated to undertake by the Minister. This difference in 
standards of behaviour in the public service raises the difficult question of whether the public servant, and the 
public organization, is indeed the servant of the Minister or the servant of the public. The answer to that question 
in most traditional models of accountability is clearly that the public servant is primarily, or even totally, the 
servant of the Minister. To the extent that there are judgments made about the public good, those judgments are 
to be made by the Minister, and a “willing suspension of judgment” may be enshrined in formal statements of 
constitutional principles. That having been said, however, both changes in the ethos of public servants as 
members of society and the increased transparency of most political systems have made maintaining internal 
control over public servants less viable than in the past. 
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The changes in Government resulting from the New Public Management have attenuated the links 
between the Minister and the public servant (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). Civil servants may have been more 
willing to accept the control of their Minister so long as they were in a career structure separated from the 
outside and the two sets of actors were closely dependent upon one another. As managerial positions in the 
public sector have been opened to outside competition, senior public managers may no longer share the values of 
their ministers, or of their colleagues who have spent an entire career in government, and they therefore may be 
less committed, not only to obedience to their Minister, but also to the ethical principles that have been common 
within the public service in countries such as Canada. 
 
Responsiveness 
Finally, the concept of responsiveness presents perhaps even more complex problems of control for the 
contemporary public sector. The opening of government and the spread of concepts such as citizen engagement 
in the industrialized democracies means that citizens feel that public services, and public servants, should be 
more responsive to them and to their demands. As well as responding to the demands of clients as individuals, 
public organizations are involved with networks of other public and private organizations, the now famous 
“stakeholders” in the policy process, that also require the public sector organization at the centre of the process 
to negotiate over both the formulation and implementation of its policy (Klijn, 1996; Sorenson and Torfing, 
2003). 
 
Conflicts within components of accountability 
These various components of accountability have the potential to operate differently, and may in practice be 
antithetical to one another. Perhaps most obviously, if the civil servant wishes to be responsive to his or her 
clients, then it may be more difficult to be strictly responsible to the laws being administered. The professional 
dilemma of the street level bureaucrat (Meyers and Vorsanger, 2003) often is which of those two dimensions of 
accountability should be pursued with the greater vigour. On the one hand, the civil servant may sincerely wish 
to serve the clientele to the greatest extent possible, and many civil servants bend the law to provide the best 
possible service, or the most desired outcomes, for their clients. On the other hand, however, he or she knows 
that there is a legal mandate that must be pursued, and for which he or she is indeed responsible. One important 
potential conflict for civil servants in these various forms of control is between responsibility and ministerial 
accountability. Traditional notions of the role of the civil service, and of accountability, involve a certain amount 
of suspension of individual judgment by civil servants in favour of following ministerial direction. The defense 
of “an order is an order,” however, is no longer sufficient, and civil servants are expected to be responsible to 
their own sense of the law and of ethics when administering the law. Few public service systems, however, have 
not provided individuals with adequate means of coping with what they consider illegal or immoral directions 
from a superior, nor have they provided those individuals— the “whistleblowers”—adequate protections from 
subsequent persecution. Further, individual public servants may believe that their primary accountability is to the 
public and to Parliament, rather than to the Minister. The difficulty in such a conception of accountability is that 
it is open to individual interpretation. Directions from the Minister should be clear, while the public interest is at 
best vague and perhaps unknowable in any definitive manner. The instructions and wishes of Parliament may be 
somewhat less obscure, but those wishes may be less immediate than those of a Minister. In autonomous 
organizations, such as Crown corporations, the multiple responsibilities of public employee may be even more 
difficult to untangle, given the existence of a board of directors, and the need to make the organization conform 
to market principles. 
 
Accountability and many hands 
When public organizations are operating within institutionalized networks of interests and must bargain with 
those interests, while being to some extent at least responsive to the wishes of those social partners, it may 
become difficult to maintain the sense of the public interest (Kearns, 2003).This difficulty in pursuing their own 
definition of the public interest may be especially apparent when the public servants are involved with other 
public and quasi-public organizations, all of whom may also claim to speak for the public as a whole. One of the 
major management and accountability issues for the contemporary public sector, therefore, appears to be 
balancing a sense of the public interest at a broad level with the particular responsibilities and demands of 
individual organizations. 
The expansion of the number of actors involved in accountability also means that public servants and 
their organization may be pressured to account for their actions and to defend them from different directions. 
Most importantly, adequate performance for one of those actors may be malfeasance or nonfeasance for another. 
One rather egregious example of multiple accountabilities occurred in the recent tsunami disaster in Asia. 
Immediately after the tsunami struck the resorts in Thailand, it appeared that thousands of vacationing Swedes 
had been killed or injured. The government did not, however, respond immediately because some public servants 
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(being responsible to law) said that there was no authorization to spend public money for the purpose of sending 
relief planes. Responsiveness to public demands quickly defeated that position (once ministers returned from the 
Christmas holidays), but at least 36 hours were lost. 
 
Assessing accountability 
An altogether different exercise is the assessment of the adequacy of a particular accountability arrangement or 
of a complete accountability regime to which a particular agency or sector is subject. Here we leave the realm of 
empirical description and enter the world of evaluation and ultimate prescription. This is much more a matter of 
degree and these assessments follow the logic of more-or-less (Sartori 1979:1039). This evaluation can proceed 
at least two levels. First of all, one could undertake a more internal, procedural evaluation of the propriety of a 
particular accountability mechanism or of a specific, concrete accountability process. This could be called 
procedural or internal adequacy. Second, one could evaluate accountability arrangement or regimes on a more 
systemic level and focus on the external effects of the accountability processes. This could be called systemic or 
external adequacy. In this case the evaluation is based on the functions that accountability arrangements fulfill in 




Research design is a master plan of the methods used to collect and analyze the data in order to verify the 
hypotheses. Purposefully, Nachmias and Nachmias (1976:29) explained research design as a model of proof that 
allows the researcher to draw inferences concerning causal relations among the variables under investigation. 
The researcher used descriptive and survey designs in this study. The descriptive design is applied to 
facilitate the research to identify the present position of Nigerian public accounts committee functions and public 
accountability. While the survey design is used to collect the primary data representing a cross-section of the 
target population of Nigerian Public Accounting Officers/Accountants and Auditors. 
The required data is all about the extent public accounts committee has impact on public accountability 
in Nigeria; impact of public accounts committee on transparency and accountability in Nigeria; and the 
significance of public accounts committee function for public accountability over financial crimes in Nigeria. 
Nevertheless, the data is used descriptively on the issues examined. 
 
Population of the study 
The target population of this study consists of mainly public accounting officers/accountants and auditors in 
Nigeria. Therefore, the study subjects were chosen from the public sector Accounting officers/Accountants and 
Auditors. The size of the primary survey of this research, numbered seventy-six (76) prospective respondents 
taken from the following government establishments of which the researcher has access: 
 PAC members in  Federal/State governments 
 Office of the Accountant – General of the Federation 
 Office of the Auditor-General for the Federation 
 Federal Ministry of Education 
 Federal Ministry of Interior Affairs 
 Federal Ministry of Works 
 Federal Ministry of Health 
 Federal Ministry of Power and Energy 
 
Sample and sampling procedure 
Sampling is the process of selecting units (e.g., people, organizations) from a population of interest so that by 
studying the sample we may fairly generalize our results back to the population from which they were 
chosen(William, 2006:20). Since this research focused on the functional impact of PAC on public accountability 
over rampant financial crimes in Nigeria, non-probability sampling method is employed to select the samples. 
According to Emory (1980:177), purposive samples normally involve a more deliberate effort to secure a sample 
that conforms to some predetermined criteria. Thus, the selection of the study subjects from the target population 
were purposively selected because they proffer facts and insight sought in the research. Besides, the purposive 
sampling made it possible to reach public accounting officers/accountants and auditors who have had 
interactions with public accounts committee. 
In line with any sampling method applied in a research, Baridam (1990:75) emphasized that there is no 
‘best’ method of drawing a sample from the population of interest. The nature and purpose of the study should 
dictate the sampling method to be used”. Hence, purposive sampling method is applied in this research to select 
the study samples from the population of interest. Therefore, the sample design for this study is indicated in table 
3.1 below, given the sample distribution of the study subjects. From the sampling distribution of subjects, we 
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have a total of seventy-six (76) sample size chosen, which is based on availability and statistical test requirement. 
 
Instrumentation 
Applying a strategy to get required information, the main instrument used in this study is the questionnaire, 
which is composed of features. The features that made up the questionnaire were designed to answer 
dichotomous questions which take the form of “Yes” or “No” response; and open-ended multiple choice 
questions with specific requirements.  
In the measurement of the variables, ordinal and nominal scales are used. Ordinal scale is used by 
assigning numbers to each scale value to show the rank order from no extent to great extent values. That is, not 
at all extent = 0; slight extent = 1; moderate extent = 2; considerate extent = 3; and great extent = 4. Thus, values 
are assigned to ordinal scale and become possible to obtain data and analyze the relationships between the 
variables that ordinally scaled by using a statistical procedure. Also, nominal scale is used to generate 
quantitative data by simply counting the number of subjects that are classified in each of the categories contained 
in Yes/No scales. The frequency of each response category to a questionnaire item are presented and interpreted. 
Hence questionnaire is the major instrument used for the data collection. 
 
Validity and reliability of instrument    
Validity is the extent to which a test measures what it claims to measure. It is vital for a test to be valid in order 
for the results to be accurately applied and interpreted. Hence, validity is an important construct in the 
measurement of research variables. It is the extent to which a test measures what is supposed to measure 
(Baridam, 1990:66). The issues involved in this research include: the function of Nigerian public accounts 
committee; PAC and Auditor-General relationship; PAC work performance; PAC review of financial activities; 
PAC evaluation of administrative activities; Accountability and popular control; Accountability and equilibrium 
of power; and Accountability and reflective governance. These issues are operationalized and measured based on 
the functional role of Nigeria Public Accounts Committee (PAC) in order to assess its impact on public 
accountability over financial crimes. For this reason, the design of the questionnaire is made to have construct 
validity meaning the degree to which a particular test can measure a hypothetical construct (Baridam, 1990:68). 
Nevertheless, the data generated from the constructs were used descriptively. To achieve this objective, 
the questions were simplified in order to administer the questionnaire effectively for better understanding before 
response. Hence, the questionnaire also has face validity, which is concerned with the researcher’s subjective 
evaluation of the validity of a measuring instrument. However, the issues investigated were made clear so as to 
avoid distortion. 
Reliability is another important construct in the measurement of research variables. It is the extent to 
which a measuring instrument is consistent in measuring whatever it measures. A measure is said to be reliable if 
it is consistently reproducible. (Baridam, 1990: 66, 69). Hence, to check the reliability of responses, each sample 
subject was cross-examined in order to ensure data collected are consistent and precise. Hence, there is an 
acceptable reliability of information obtained. 
 
Method of data collection 
A questionnaire method is used to collect the data from the selected subjects. The questionnaire contains thirty-
five (35) items, which were administered to eighty-five (85) public accounting officers/accountants and auditors 
based on the list of Federal government establishments within Rivers and Bayelsa states. However, seventy-six 
(76) usable questionnaires provided the database (given a 89% response rate). Nevertheless, the researcher also 
employed face-to-face interview method to cross-examine the respondents in order to ensure data collected is 
authentic. In line with this method of data collection, Baridam (1990:83) stressed the need that “Questionnaires 
and interviews are most used when the researcher wants to find out a person’s knowledge, motivations, 
anticipations, attitudes, beliefs, feelings, future plans or past behaviors”. 
For the purpose of analysis as per category of issues investigated, a frequency count of each 
questionnaire items is made. Table 3.2 indicates the specification of questionnaire items per category of issues 
investigated. 
 
Method of data   analysis 
The data obtained from the frequency count of each response are classified into categories of Public Accounting 
officers/Accountants and Auditors respectively, Ordinal and nominal scales of measurement were used to 
generate quantitative data. The frequencies in each category are being used for analysis to answer the research 
questions and verify the hypotheses. 
According to Lind and Mason (1997:416), the chi-square goodness-of-fit test is one of the most 
commonly used nonparametric tests and it is appropriate for nominal and ordinal levels of data. Chi-square 
goodness-of-fit as the name implies, is purposeful to determine how well an observed set of data fits an expected 
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set of data. For this reason, chi-square analysis is used to test the significance of the data to weigh the evidence 
obtained from the data before reaching conclusion. However, the coefficient of contingency is applied to 
determine how well the observed relationship between the dependent and independent variables is strong or 
weak. 
The chi-square is designated as “ X²  “ and is computed by: 
                                                     X²       =      ∑ (fo - fe)² / fe 
with k – 1 degree of freedom where, 
      fo    is an observed frequency in a particular category  
      fe    is an expected frequency in a particular category 
      k     is the number of categories. 
The chi-square output model is evaluated at 0.05 level of significance. 
    
DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
Data Presentation 
To present the data in an effective way, the results of the measures are summarized in a tabulated form. Thus, the 
data obtained from the following measures are summarized under the issues being investigated in this study.  
(I) Significant relationship between public accounts committee and public     
          accountability in Nigeria is operationalized and measured in  
           terms of: 
 Functions of PAC                    
 PAC & Auditor-General relationship 
 
(II) Impact of public accounts committee on transparency and  
          accountability in Nigeria is defined and measured in terms of: 
 PAC work performance                             
 PAC review of financial activities 
 PAC evaluation of admin. activities           
 
(III) Significance of public accounts committee function for public  
              accountability over financial crimes in Nigeria is operationalized  
              and measured in terms of: 
 Accountability and Popular control             
 Accountability and Equilibrium of Power    
 Accountability and Reflective governance    
 
Functions of Public Accounts Committee 
The committee deals with appropriation of government funds, the report of the Auditor-General and other related 
matters as the Commissioner of finance may refer to the committee. Among other things, PAC scrutinize money 
shown in the accounts whether it is officially funded by Authority to incur expenditure (AIE) and applicable to 
the service or purpose to which they have been charged. PAC’s function also examines the statements of 
accounts showing the income and expenditure of autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies the audit of which 
may be conducted by the Auditor-general under the direction of statutory requirement. The issue is that to what 
extent PAC carries out these functions and what impact on public accountability to serve as hedge to financial 
crimes in Nigeria? The data on table 4.1 will confirm the extent to which PAC function has impact on public 
accountability. 
From the data on Table 4.1, a total of 268 out of 532 responses (50%) indicate to a considerable extent 
that PAC function has effect on public accountability, while only 2 out of 532 responses (0.3%) indicate to no 
extent. This suggests that the function of PAC to a considerable extent has effect on public accountability in 
Nigeria. For instance, about 98% response of questionnaire item number 5, confirmed that to a considerable 
extent PAC examines financial statements of government corporations and project works carried out, and follow-
up to ascertain if at all the accounts were prepared under the provisions of the statutory rules in accordance with 
due process. 
 
PAC and Auditor-General relationship 
To ensure public accountability over financial crimes in Nigeria, the PAC is the primary audience of the 
Auditor-General. Therefore, it is vital that a cordial relationship exist between the two. The point is that while 
PAC depends on high quality audit reporting to be effective, the Auditor-General on the other hand, requires an 
effective PAC to ensure that departments take audit outcomes seriously. The question is, to what extent PAC 
maintained a cordial relationship with Auditor-General to ensure public accountability in Nigeria? Table 4.2 
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presents data that indicate the extent to which PAC maintains a cordial relationship with Auditor-General in 
Nigeria. 
The data on table 4.2 indicates that 150 out of 518 responses (28%) confirm to a great extent about the 
relationship between PAC and Auditor-General. While 108 out of 518 responses (20%) indicate to slight extents. 
This shows that in Nigeria, PAC maintained a relationship with Auditor-General but not cordial. 
 
PAC work performance 
In ideal situation, there are mechanisms set in place for the measurement of PAC performance, so that its 
function is effective. Thus, PAC function ensures that all erring Accounting officers are included in their report 
and recommendations for necessary action. Hence, PAC must have the opportunity and resources to effectively 
examine any fiscal report that it deems necessary. In this regard, how effective did PAC carry out its function in 
Nigeria? The result of the survey on this issue is summarized on table 4.3. 
Taking a critical look at table 4.3, the data indicate 50% Vs 49% respective responses of positive and 
negative opinions about Nigerian PAC work performance. This suggests that the credibility of PAC function in 
Nigeria is debatable.  For instance, 100% response indicates a negative opinion that there are no mechanisms in 
place to measure PAC performance in Nigeria. While 100% response indicate a positive opinion that PAC 
scrutinize all the reports prepared by Auditor-General. 
 
PAC review of financial activities 
Under normal circumstances, PAC usually reviews the information in the public accounts for reliability and 
appropriations. Hence, matters raised in the Auditor-General’s annual report are reviewed so as to deal with 
financial issues accordingly. To this effect, PAC examines past and committed expenditures as they relate 
directly to and have an impact on matters falling within the year under review for proper understanding. Is this 
also applicable to Nigerian PAC’s practice? The outcome of the survey is summarized on table 4.4. 
The data on table 4.4 (see appendix) indicates that 214 out of 294 responses (72%) show affirmative 
sense that PAC review financial activities in Nigeria. For instance, 100% response confirm that PAC review 
matters raised in the Auditor-General’s annual report so as to deal with financial issues accordingly in Nigeria. 
Nevertheless, 80% indicate negative response about Nigerian PAC function of examining past and committed 
expenditures. This suggests that there are lapses in Nigerian PAC function to minimize financial crimes which 
may be involved in past and committed expenditures that fall within the year required to be reviewed. 
 
PAC evaluation of administrative activities 
For PAC function to have impact on public accountability, proper evaluation of administrative activities must 
take effect. Therefore, it is equitable on the part of Public Accounts Committee to evaluate the collection and 
accounting for revenues; examine the probity and value for money in tax expenditures; evaluate the adequacy of 
safeguarding assets from loss, waste and misappropriation; and examine whether appropriate financial 
management controls are in existence or not. Does Nigerian public accounts committee carry out such 
demanding functions in evaluating administrative activities? The result of the survery on this issue is 
summarized on table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 shows that 182 out of 304 (59%) indicate negative response of effective PAC function on 
evaluating administrative activities, while 40% give affirmative response. This suggest that even though 
Nigerian PAC system observe the practice of evaluating administrative activities, it is not done effectively or 
absolutely to make impact on public accountability. For instance, 100% response (of questionnaire item number 
26) indicates that Nigerian PAC does not examine whether appropriate financial management controls are in 
existence or not. This confirms negligence on the part of PAC, which might have paved way for financial crimes 
in Nigeria. 
 
Accountability and popular control 
Significance of public accounts committee for reduction of financial crimes involve accountability and popular 
control. That is to say, creating accountability forum in which actors with democratic legitimacy participate and 
rely on having an adequate information position and enforceable sanction options at their disposal. Among other 
things, accountability forums have enough inquisitive powers to reveal corruption or mismanagement in Nigeria. 
Table 4.6 summarized the results of the survey on accountability and popular control practice in Nigeria. 
From the data on table 4.6, we have 148 out of 224 responses (66%) indicate that there is 
accountability forum and popular control in Nigeria. While 34% response disagree. Examining the data, about 
100% response agree that accountability arrangements indirectly provide information to democratically 
legitimize actors about the propriety and the effectiveness of the conduct and actions of government bodies. 
Nevertheless, 59% response indicate that such accountability forum observed in Nigeria never offer enough 
incentives to agents to commit themselves to the agenda of their democratically elected principals. 
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Accountability and equilibrium of power 
In actual practice, accountability forums have a enough inquisitive powers to reveal corruption or 
mismanagement in Nigeria. Under normal conditions, the administrative bodies should have incentives to engage 
in proactive and sincere account giving in any case. The issue is, does accountability arrangement help to 
discourage corruption and improper governance in Nigeria state? The outcome of the survey is summarized on 
table 4.7. 
It is conspicuous that the data on table 4.7 helps to interpret the practice of accountability and 
equilibrium of power.  About 57% responses indicate no genuine practice of accountability and equilibrium of 
power in Nigeria, while 43% response indicates affirmative opinion. Digressing further on the data presented, 
60% response signifies that the accountability arrangement does not help to discourage corruption and improper 
governance in Nigeria. This suggests that the accountability arrangement is not effective but rather it is a 
formality to fulfill assumed obligation. 
 
Accountability and reflective governance 
Accountability arrangement contributes to the availability of information about former and current 
administrative actions for the administrative body involved and a wider range of administrative bodies. The 
accountability arrangement stimulates internal reflection and the ensuing learning conduct in administrative 
bodies and those holding public office. Does the accountability arrangement stimulate the accountability forums 
and the administrative actors to supervising the institutionalization and dissemination of lessons learned?  Table 
4.8 presents the result of the survey on accountability and reflective governance in Nigeria.             
The data on table 4.8 indicate 79% negative and 21% positive responses against the practice of 
accountability and reflective governance in Nigeria. For instance, 100% response (item no. 33) shows negative 
opinion about the practice of accountability arrangement, which could have contributed to the availability of 
information about former and current administrative actions.  It is therefore clear that Nigeria system of 
governance lack genuine and adequate accountability arrangement in order to curb financial crimes. 
 
Data Analysis 
Analysis of data involves the use of data obtained and presented to the test the hypotheses formulated in the 
study, which is based on impact assessment of public accounts committee function on public accountability over 
financial crimes. This includes the relationship between the function of public accounts committee and public 
accountability in Nigeria; significant impact of public accounts committee function on transparency and 
accountability in Nigeria; and great significance of public accounts committee function for public accountability 
over financial crimes in Nigeria. 
The chi-square goodness-of-fit test, which is an appropriate non-parametric test, is used to determine 
how well an observed set of the data fits an expected set of data. Hence, the chi-square analysis is used to test the 
significance of the data to weigh the evidence obtained from the data before reaching conclusion. 
 
Testing of hypothesis 1 
The study proposed hypothesis (H1), to examine if “There is a positive and significant relationship between the 
function of public accounts committee and public accountability in Nigeria”. This is determined by the extent to 
which public accounts committee function has impact on public accountability in Nigeria. It is therefore 
measured in terms of the functions of PAC, and the relationship between Public accounts committee and 
Auditor-General. 
The summary results of the survey are shown on table 4.9, which indicates the extent PAC function 
has impact on public accountability in Nigeria and the details of the relationship between them.  The value of the 
chi-square analysis X² = 72.19, and the critical value is 9.49 for 4 degrees of freedom at 0.05 level of 
significance. This gives us ample evidence to believe that there is a positive and significant relationship between 
public accounts committee function and public accountability in Nigeria. Therefore, the alternate hypothesis (H1) 
is accepted based on the criteria that the calculated value (72.19) is greater than the critical value (9.49). 
A careful examination of Table 4.9, (51%) confirm to a considerable extent that public accounts 
committee function has impact on public accountability. If there is no relationship whatsoever between PAC 
function and public accountability, it can be expected, thus, that 51% of the 5 responses would indicate to no 
extent. Hence, the expected frequency for that cell is 3. However, from the table we have 268 out of 532 
responses (50%) indicate to a considerable extent that there is a relationship between PAC function and public 
accountability. On the other hand, 49% responses confirm the collaborative effort between PAC and Auditor-
General towards the enhancement of public accountability. 
Based on the above findings it is necessary to test the relationship between PAC function and public 
accountability whether it is strong or weak.  Measuring the strength of correlation between PAC function and 
public accountability in Bayelsa will help us to ascertain if the revealed relationship is strong or not. Hence, the 
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coefficient of contingency symbolized by “C” is applied to measure the correlation between the two variables. 
 
 
                 C     =                x²                  
                                       n – x² 
 
where X  = calculate chi-square and  n = grand total. Thus, we have       
  
                 C    =                72.19             =                         0.0738         =   0.27 
                                      1050 – 72.19                 
     In the measurement of correlation between two variables, zero signifies a very week relationship, while 1.0 
indicates a very strong relationship. The closer the value of ‘C’ to 1.0, the stronger the relationship of the 
variables being considered (Baridam, 1990:185).  From the calculation of coefficient of contingency, C = 0.27. 
This result shows a very weak correlation between Public accounts committee function and public accountability. 
The weak association between the two variables may be explained by lack of cordial relationship maintained 
between PAC and Auditor-General, as well as lack of efficient and effective approach to carry out PAC 
functions in Nigeria. 
   
Testing of hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis (H2) this study proposed is to examine whether “There is a significant impact of public 
accounts committee function on transparency and accountability in Nigeria”. This is investigated in terms of 
PAC work performance; PAC practice of reviewing financial activities; and PAC practice of evaluating 
administrative activities. The summary results of the survey on this proposition are shown on Table 4.10. 
The chi-square analysis X² = 66.11, and the critical value is 5.99 for 2 degrees of freedom at 0.05 level 
of significance. This reveals that there is a significant impact of public accounts committee function on 
transparency and accountability in Nigeria. Therefore, the alternate hypothesis (H2) is accepted based on the 
criteria that the calculated value (66.11) is greater than the critical value (5.99). 
As can be seen from table 4.10, 51% response positively and 49% response express negative opinion 
on PAC work performance. This revealed that Nigerian PAC work performance is not good enough to enhance 
transparency and accountability in the state. However, 72% response shows that PAC does review financial 
activities; while 60% response disagrees that PAC never give consideration to evaluate administrative activities 
in Nigeria. 
 
Testing of hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis this study proposed is to examine if “There is a great significance of public accounts 
committee function for public accountability over financial crimes in Nigeria”. Basically, the study looks into 
this issue in terms of accountability and popular control; accountability and equilibrium of power; and 
accountability and reflective governance. The table 4.11 summarized the results of the survey carried out on 
significance of public accounts committee function for public accountability over financial crimes in Nigeria. 
The summary results of the survey data on table 4.11, 66% give affirmative response on accountability 
and popular control. This reveals that accountability offers actors with democratic legitimacy possibilities to 
control administration, policy and organization. However, in reality such practice is minimal in Nigeria 
compared to the degree to which accountability arrangements or regimes directly or indirectly contribute to the 
possibilities for actors with democratic legitimacy to monitor, evaluate and adjust the propriety and effectiveness 
of government conduct. As can be seen on table 4.11, 57% response indicates negative opinion about 
accountability and equilibrium of power. In respect of constitutional perspective, accountability is essential in 
order to withstand the ever-present tendency toward power concentration in the executive. But there is no 
seriousness in observing accountability and equilibrium of power, undermining the fact that accountability 
forums are able to contribute to the prevention of corruption and the abuse of powers. Regarding accountability 
and reflective governance, 79% response indicates negative opinion on table 4.1. This means the learning 
perspective of political administrators in Nigeria is absent minded. Otherwise, accountability arrangements 
stimulate administrative bodies and officials to achieve a higher awareness of the environment, increase self-
reflection and induce the ability to change. Hence, accountability is an essential condition for learning by 
administrative bodies and holders of executive positions. 
 
Discussion of findings 
The results of the study provided empirical evidence that verified the hypotheses proposed and answers the 
research questions.  The findings, inter alia, revealed that there is a positive and significant relationship between 
public accounts committee function and public accountability. However, the correlation coefficient computation 
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of 0.27 shows that the relationship between the function of public accounts committee and public accountability 
is very weak. The study revealed that PAC system in Nigeria lacks efficient and effective approach to enhance 
public accountability as a result of overlooking at certain issues, which require rapt attention. The findings 
revealed that PAC maintained relationship with Auditor-General, but not cordial. Then PAC follow-up of 
Auditor-General annual report would not be as serious as ensuring accountability according to public demand. 
Because, accountability serve as an instrument to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of public governance, 
which supposed to have being the state goal. 
Transparency and accountability in Nigeria: The study revealed that there is a significant impact of 
PAC function on transparency and accountability. The findings of PAC work performance revealed that the 
committee actually carry out a measure of statutory duties but not good enough to enhance transparency and 
accountability. Thus, the credibility of PAC function in Nigeria is debatable. Besides, there is no mechanism set 
in place to measure PAC performance in Bayelsa. Normally, PAC reviews financial activities but very slack in 
following up reports and recommendations made by the committee itself. Hence, no much consideration given to 
evaluate administrative activities. In other words, there are lapses in PAC function to minimize financial crimes 
which may involve in past and committed expenditures that fall within the year required to be reviewed. 
Furthermore, from all indications of the study, Nigerian PAC does not examine whether appropriate financial 
management controls are in existence or not. This is not encourageable to enhance transparency and 
accountability in order to over come financial crimes in Nigeria. 
The study findings also indicate that there is a great significance of public accounts committee function 
for public accountability over financial crimes in Nigeria. The fact is that accountability offers actors with 
democratic legitimacy possibilities to control administration, policy and organization. However, it was observed 
that such practice is minimal in Nigeria when compared to the degree to which accountability arrangements or 
regimes directly or indirectly contribute to the possibilities for actors with democratic legitimacy to monitor, 
evaluate and adjust the propriety and effectiveness of government conduct. Regarding the power concentration in 
the executive, there is no check on accountability and equilibrium of power, forgetting that accountability forums 
are able to contribute to the prevention of corruption and the abuse of powers. However, this study does not 
overrule the performance of PAC but the seriousness in pursuance of mandatory functions in ideal situation does 
not exist. In spite of this, accountability and reflective governance is also lacking for the fact that learning 
perspective of political administrators in Nigeria is not encouraging. Genuine accountability arrangements 
stimulate administrative bodies and officials to achieve a higher awareness of the environment, increase self-
reflection and induce the ability to change. Indeed, it is an essential condition for learning by administrative 
bodies and holders of executive positions. 
The extent PAC function actually ensures public accountability in Nigeria: Though, the study findings 
revealed that to a considerable extent there is a relationship between PAC function and public accountability, 
efficiency and effectiveness are being absorbed by political party influences, carry-go concept and man-know-
man phenomenon through out the country. Therefore, to a moderate extent PAC functions ensure public 
accountability in Nigeria. 
PAC functions and the Auditor-General’s independent support.  Auditor-General acts as an 
independent auditor to the government in order to protect the interest of the public. But think of a situation where 
an auditor who performs independent duties is made dependent, then, it is quite clear that the auditor is restricted 
to a limit in expressing his opinion. It is a known fact that PAC relies on the annual reports of the Auditor-
General whose duties are restricted below his capacity, and then this will actually affect an absolute annual 
report for PAC to work on. If this would be the case, then PAC’s work would be perfunctory just to fulfill an 
obligation, which can never make a tremendous impact on public accountability in Nigeria.  Hence, from time to 
time Nigeria loses a great deal of public funds and operational assets. Thus, the supporting function of the 
auditor general to the PAC needs not to be over emphasized. The office of the auditor general is the primary 
resource available to PAC, who depends on the nature and extent of expertise in the audit institution, of which 
PAC has access to substantial logistical and technical support. 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
The PAC is a particularly important and venerable committee of legislature. It is placed at the apex of legislative 
oversight of public finances. From the discussion of findings in the previous chapter, the study discovered that 
there is a positive and significant relationship between PAC function and public accountability. Though the 
relationship is very weak due to lack of maintaining cordial between them. Not only that, Nigerian PAC lacked 
systematic approach in carrying out its function to enhance public accountability. 
The study findings also revealed that PAC in actual function carry out a measure of statutory duties but 
not good enough to enhance transparency and accountability in Nigeria. It was also observed that there are lapses 
in PAC function to minimize financial crimes which may involve in past and committed expenditures.  However, 
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the study revealed that there is great significance of PAC function for public accountability over financial crimes 
Nigeria. Thus, awareness has been created of PAC functions and its importance in the role of enhancing 
transparency and accountability in Nigeria. There is no check on accountability and equilibrium of power, 
therefore, under minding that accountability forums are able to contribute to the prevention of corruption and the 
abuse of powers. 
Regarding accountability and reflective governance, the study also observed that there is no much 
learning perspective of political administrators in Nigeria. Otherwise, accountability arrangements could have 
stimulated administrative bodies and officials to achieve a higher awareness of the environment, increase self-
reflection and induce the ability to change. Nevertheless, among other things, the study unraveled the fact that 
PAC function to a moderate extent enhanced public accountability in Nigeria. Finally, the study discover that 
Auditor General dependency on auditees is not helping matters with due regard to giving adequate support to the 
PAC in terms of producing absolute annual report. 
 
Conclusions 
The research study has examined the functional impact of PAC on public accountability over financial crimes in 
Nigeria. Although, our data centered mainly on some selected Federal government accounting 
officers/accountants and auditors in as the researcher’s accessible population in Nigeria, it is believed that the 
information obtained may not be very different from others. Hence, the findings of the study revealed that there 
is a positive functional impact of PAC on public accountability over financial crimes in Nigeria. 
However, the study focused on the following ideas: (1) there is a positive and significant relationship 
between the function of public accounts committee and public accountability in Nigeria; (2) there is a significant 
impact of public accounts committee function on transparency and accountability in Nigeria; and (3) there is a 
great significance of public accounts committee function for public accountability over financial crimes in 
Nigeria. 
The analysis of the data obtained from the survey positively supports all the propositions. This is 
evidenced by the findings that to a moderate extent PAC function have impact on public accountability over 
financial crimes in Nigeria. Being exposed to the international standard of PAC functions to enhance public 
accountability, it has made a strong impression on Nigeria political administrators, accounting 
officers/accountants and auditors in federal government. Outstandingly, it offers us the knowledge of skillful 
approach to the requirements of accountability and popular control; accountability and equilibrium of power; 
accountability and reflective governance; etc.  We should therefore, conclude that the function of PAC to a 
moderate extent has impact on public accountability over financial crimes in Nigeria. 
 
Recommendations 
With regards to the findings of the study just concluded, we recommend the following suggestions to enhance 
public accountability over financial crimes in Nigeria. 
1. A cordial working relationship between the PAC and the auditor general should be maintained. 
2. It is high time for us to practice our indigenous Audit Act that will make the office of the Auditor-
General independent body. That is only when anti-corruption goals would be visualized. 
3. The PAC should be engaged in a constant exchange with the auditor general to ensure that information 
is provided when it is needed, and in an accessible and useful format. 
4. PAC deliberations should be open to the media and the interested public and any exceptions from this 
rule need to be thoroughly justified, reasonably justifiable, and limited to exceptional circumstances. 
5. Nigerian PAC should be increasingly concerned with assessing whether the state government obtained 
value for money in public spending. 
6. PAC should look into the aspects of evaluating collection and accounting for revenues; examine the 
probity and value for money in tax expenditures; evaluate the adequacy of safeguarding assets from loss, 
waste and misappropriation; and examine whether appropriate financial management controls are in 
existence or not. Thus, proper evaluation of administrative activities could be effective. 
7. There should be genuine practice of accountability and equilibrium of power so that power 
concentration in the executive is checked to pave way for accountability forums to contribute to the 
prevention of corruption in Nigeria.   
8. There is a great need of accountability and reflective governance so that learning perspective of political 
administrators in Nigeria should be encouraged, increase self-reflection and induce the ability to change. 
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Definition of terms 
For clarity purpose of the subject matter, the following key terms used in this study are conceptually defined. 
 
Administrative Accountability: This is a wide range of quasi-legal forums exercising independent and external 
administrative and financial supervision and control, has been established in the past decades – some even speak 
of an “audit explosion” (Power, 1994). 
 
Assessment: An opinion about something that has been thought about very carefully (Hornby 2006:75). 
 
Financial Crimes: These are acts of fraudulent practices that include money laundering, shady deals, 
embezzlement, sharp practice of dishonest gains, etc. 
 
Impact: This means creating strong impression or effect on things or persons. For example, the impact of new 
ideas on backward race of people. 
 
Political Accountability: Is an extremely important type of public accountability within democracies. Here, 
accountability often can be interpreted as a chain of principal agent relations (Strom 2000). 
 
Professional Accountability: Many public managers are, apart from being general managers, professionals in a 
more technical sense. They have been trained as engineers, doctors, veterinarians, teachers, or police officers 
(Abbot, 1988; Freidson, 2001). This may implies accountability relationships with professional associations and 
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Public Accountability: Holders of public office are accountable for their decisions and actions to the public and 
must submit themselves to whatever scrutiny is appropriate to their office. 
Public Accounts Committee: This is an important and venerable institution of parliament. It is placed at the 
apex of legislature oversight of public finances. 
 
Public Interest: This is bound closely to the need of maintaining the proper use of public authority for public 
purpose. 
 
Social Accountability: In reaction to a perceived lack of trust in government, there is an urge in many western 
democracies for more direct and explicit accountability relations between public agencies on the one hand and 
clients and civil society on the other hand (McCandless, 2001). 
 
Transparency: Given account in a clear view of the events or activities taken place in an organization or 
establishment. 
 





Table 4.1: Assessment of Public Accounts Committee functions 
 
Source :  Survey data, 2009. 
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Legend:     N = not at all/not applicable;      S = slight extent; 
                M = moderate extent;                C = considerable extent 
                G = great extent. 
 
     Table 4.2 
Relationship between Public Accounts Committee and Auditor-General 
 
Source :  Survey data, 2009. 
 
Table 4.3 
Assessment of PAC work Performance 
 
Source : Survey data, 2009. 
 
Table 4.4 
PAC practice of reviewing financial activities 
 
Source : Survey data, 2009. 
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Public accounts committee evaluation of administrative activities 
 
Source : Survey data, 2009. 
 
Table 4.6 
Practice of accountability and popular control 
 
Source : Survey data, 2009. 
 
Table 4.7 
Practice of accountability and equilibrium of power 
 
Source : Survey data, 2009. 
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Practice of accountability and reflective governance 
 
Source : Survey data, 2009. 
 
Testing of hypothesis 1:  The study proposed hypothesis (H1), to examine if “There is a positive and significant 
relationship between the function of public accounts committee and public accountability in Nigeria”. 
 
Table 4.9 
Public accounts committee function and public accountability in Nigeria. 
 
Source : Summary data on Tables 4.1 and 4.2 
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Applying the chi-square goodness-of-fit test, we have the following analysis of the observed frequencies (fo) and 
the expected frequencies (fe) for all the cells in Table 4.9. 
 
The value of the chi-square analysis X² = 72.19, and the critical value is 9.49 for 4 degrees of freedom at 0.05 
level of significance. This gives us ample evidence to believe that there is a positive and significant relationship 
between public accounts committee function and public accountability in Nigeria. 
 
Testing of hypothesis 2:  The second hypothesis (H2) this study proposed is to examine whether “There is a 
significant impact of public accounts committee function on transparency and accountability in Nigeria”. This is 
investigated in terms of PAC work performance; PAC practice of reviewing financial activities; and PAC 
practice of evaluating administrative activities. The summary results of the survey on this proposition are shown 
on Table 4.10. 
 
Table 4.10: PAC function on transparency and accountability in Nigeria 
 
Source : Summary data on Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 
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Applying the chi-square goodness-of-fit test, we have the following analysis of the observed frequencies (fo) and 
the expected frequencies (fe) for all the cells in Table 4.10. 
 
 
The above chi-square analysis X² = 66.11, and the critical value is 5.99 for 2 degrees of freedom at 0.05 level of 
significance. This reveals that there is a significant impact of public accounts committee function on 
transparency and accountability in Nigeria. Therefore, the alternate hypothesis (H2) is accepted based on the 
criteria that the calculated value (66.11) is greater than the critical value (5.99). 
 
Table 4.11:  Significance of PAC function for public accountability over financial crime  in Nigeria. 
 
Source : Summary data on Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 
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Applying the chi-square goodness-of-fit test, we have the following analysis of the observed frequencies (fo) and 
the expected frequencies (fe) for all the cells in Table 4.11. 
 
 
The chi-square analysis X² = 92.75, while the critical value is 5.99 for 2 degrees of freedom at 0.05 level of 
significance. This reveals that there is a great significance of PAC function for public accountability over 
financial crimes in Bayelsa state. Therefore, the alternate hypothesis (H3) is accepted based on the criteria that 
the calculated value 92.75 is greater than the critical value 5.99. 
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